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Abstract 
 
Temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) can be associated with a marked impairment of autobiographical 
memory. This is occasionally its presenting feature.  We describe two individuals with severe epilepsy-
associated autobiographical memory loss. Both MB and PT were reassured initially that their memory 
was intact on the basis of standard neuropsychological tests. Both have written detailed accounts of 
their symptoms. The key neuropsychological features of their cases are the relative normality of 
performance on standard memory tests, with preservation of semantic memory for impersonal 
information, in contrast to a profound amnesia for salient autobiographical episodes and an 
impoverishment of imaginative scene construction. First person accounts from these individuals 
illustrate the importance of autobiographical memory in sustaining a coherent sense of self, informing 
interpersonal relationships and supporting future thinking and problem-solving. These cases 
contribute to the growing evidence for a distinctive pattern of autobiographical memory loss 
associated with TLE, and indicate that it can take a severe form affecting both personal semantics and 
episodic recollection. Defining the phase of memory processing most relevant to this form of amnesia, 
and the roles of physiological and structural pathology, requires further research. The paper’s title 
refers to the introspective ‘void’ highlighted by both MB and PT in their reports – in PT’s words: ‘My 
primary symptom is the void that is my past’.  
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Highlights  
Temporal lobe epilepsy can cause profound autobiographical amnesia (AbA) 
Performance on standard memory tests may be normal 
The AbA impacts sense of self, interpersonal relationships and future planning 
Epilepsy-related AbA can be mistaken for dissociative or ‘psychogenic’ amnesia 
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1 Introduction 
‘My primary symptom is the void that is my past’  
Two accounts can be given of every human disorder. The first evokes the sufferer’s experience, 
describing the ‘view from within’. Such ‘autopathographies’ have become a recognised genre of 
medical narrative over the past half century, perhaps in response to the increasingly technical and 
dispassionate nature of contemporary medicine (Hawkins, 1999; Kapur, 1997; Kearney, 2006; O’Brien, 
2010). The second form of account, the kind typically found in scientific journals, maps a disorder’s 
clinical features, using terms designed to facilitate diagnosis, treatment and research. Clinicians are 
well used to translating informal first person accounts into clinical terms in the course of medical care. 
Once in a while, they deserve to be published in their own right.  
The first author was contacted via our epilepsy-memory project website 
(http://projects.exeter.ac.uk/time/) by two patients who had independently come to the conclusion 
that their profound autobiographical memory loss might be linked to their relatively subtle epilepsy. 
There was a striking convergence of themes and conclusions in the two accounts. The aim of this paper 
is to describe these patients’ disorders using both first and third person approaches, summarising the 
key themes of the first-hand accounts and mapping the objective features of their amnesia, before 
situating their disorders in the wider landscape of autobiographical memory disorders.  
The neuropsychological profile of their amnesia - with normal or only mildly abnormal anterograde 
memory on standard tests but profound autobiographical amnesia in association with temporal lobe 
epilepsy -  is relatively novel but echoes other recent descriptions (Noulhiane et al., 2007; Butler & 
Zeman, 2008b; Milton et al., 2010; Zeman, Butler, Muhlert, & Milton, 2013; Addis, Moscovitch, & 
McAndrews, 2007; Tramoni et al., 2011; Hornberger et al., 2010).  
2 Materials and Methods 
2.1 Participants  
Clinical summaries  
Case i: PT is a 51 year old senior academic working in the Sciences. Following a successful career at 
college and graduate school, from which he graduated summa cum laude, he has taught in several 
University positions, and is currently head of his department. At around the age of 10, he had the first 
attack of a kind that has continued intermittently throughout his life. He feels hot or clammy, has a 
sense of fear or dread, remains aware of his surroundings but finds it hard to interpret or react to 
what he can see and hear and becomes unable to communicate. These episodes last for a minute or 
two. Observers have reported that his eyes remain open, he has occasionally stumbled or dropped on 
all fours and has rubbed his stomach with one hand. ‘Psychomotor epilepsy’ was diagnosed in his early 
teens and he was treated for a few years with Phenytoin which was effective. The attacks recurred in 
his early twenties, off treatment, occurring from then on at least once every few months, but he did 
not recognise their connection with his previous malady. At the age of 44 he had an episode at the 
wheel in which he came close to losing control of his car. A neurologist diagnosed temporal lobe 
epilepsy (TLE) and prescribed Oxcarbazepine which PT continues to take, with no further seizures until 
a single, recent, typical, episode. Following the diagnosis, PT became increasingly aware of a memory 
problem which he believes had been present at least since his teens, and possibly lifelong, but which 
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he had so far as possible ignored: a profound amnesia for autobiographical episodes. He also reports 
that his memories for recent events fade more rapidly than one would expect, so that he becomes 
unable to recollect their experiential details over days or weeks. He has always had an exceedingly 
poor memory for what should be very familiar routes. The results of his early EEGs are unavailable. 
Recent EEGs (2010/11) and structural MRI scans of the brain have been normal. Neuropsychological 
evaluation at a University medical centre in 2011 was normal with the exception of qualitative 
difficulty in recalling autobiographical episodes. PT performed normally on standard 
neuropsychological tests in a second comprehensive evaluation at another centre (University of 
California, San Francisco (UCSF)) in 2014, generally scoring within normal limits with the exception of 
measures of autobiographical memory (see Supplementary Material for detailed neuropsychological 
results). 
Case ii: MB is a 78 year old retired IT systems analyst who grew up in the United Kingdom, studying 
Mathematics at Oxford University, before emigrating to the US in his early twenties, where he worked 
in the IT industry. He suffered from migraine as a child. In 1981, at the age of 42, he had a brief episode 
of speech arrest witnessed by his sister. Some weeks later he went on to have a witnessed tonic-clonic 
seizure without warning, dislocating his shoulder. Brain MRI was normal but an EEG showed evidence 
of a temporal lobe epileptic focus, which a subsequent recording suggested was right-sided. He was 
treated with Phenytoin. In 1986 he had a further tonic-clonic seizure preceded by a brief, nondescript, 
aura. At around the same time he developed a mood disorder, treated with Sertraline. An EEG in 2000 
showed ‘slow sharp complexes’ arising independently from both hemispheres in the fronto-temporal 
regions, consistent with an ‘irritative or paroxysmal disorder’. In 2007, at the age of 69, he became 
aware, for the first time, of a profound amnesia for autobiographical episodes, affecting at least 30 
years of his adult life. Like PT, he also noticed that his memories for recent events were fading more 
rapidly than he would expect, so that he became unable to recollect their details over days or weeks. 
His recall for previously familiar routes was impaired. His memory for news events was relatively 
intact.  Despite these pronounced memory symptoms, a formal neuropsychological assessment 
undertaken at an Alzheimer’s Disease Centre concluded that ‘cognitive functioning, including general 
memory, is in the normal range’. In the same year, he noticed a marked reduction in his sense of smell, 
which has persisted. In 2009 he had a second episode of major mood disorder, and was treated with 
several psychotropic medications, from which he successfully withdrew in 2012, with the exception of 
Sertraline which he continues to take. Lamotrigine was substituted for Phenytoin and subsequently 
discontinued. Between 2010 and 2013 he had six episodes of transient amnesia with disorientation, 
all on waking from sleep, lasting for around half an hour, without repetitive questioning. An EEG in 
2011 showed some non-specific slowing of activity over the left temporal lobe. A further MRI scan of 
the brain performed in 2010 showed minor white matter changes and global atrophy, both considered 
age-appropriate. A second assessment at the same Alzheimer’s disease Centre in 2011 again gave 
substantially normal results.  MB performed poorly on one of three verbal memory measures in each 
of these assessments (immediate and delayed (11 minutes) story recall in 2007; short (circa 1 minutes) 
and long (circa 11 minutes) delay recalls of a word list in 2011), but normally on the remaining 
measures on each occasion. Assessment at UCSF in 2013 showed a flattened verbal learning curve. 
Taken together these neuropsychological results suggest a somewhat inconsistent, mild, stable 
anterograde verbal memory impairment (see Supplementary Material for detailed neuropsychological 
results). His most recent MRI scan of the brain showed generalized age-appropriate atrophy, with 
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slightly more prominent volume loss in the anterior hippocampi, and no evidence for hippocampal 
sclerosis. He has recently resumed treatment with Lamotrigine.  
2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 The patient’s accounts 
We have extracted the principal themes of MB’s and PT’s accounts of their distinctive pattern of 
amnesia, and provide illustrative examples of their writings below. The original documents are 
supplied as Supplementary Material. MB has written several accounts of his amnesia, of varying 
length: the document available on-line is a wide-ranging memoir of his experience. In contrast, PT 
used the document reproduced here to record examples of his memory difficulties as these occurred: 
his writings are therefore closer to the raw experience of his amnesia and less selective than MB’s. 
PT’s writings have been edited lightly to preserve anonymity. MB can also be seen giving a summary 
version of his memoir at http://millvalleylibrary.net/nakedtruth/marcus-byruck/. 
2.2.2 Neuropsychological assessment (administered October 2012) 
The National Adult Reading Test (Nelson HE & Willison J, 1991) was used to obtain a measure of 
premorbid IQ. The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) was used to assess current 
IQ(Wechsler D, 1999). The Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination-Revised (ACE-R) (Mioshi, Dawson, 
Mitchell, Arnold, & Hodges, 2006) was administered as a widely used screening test of general 
cognition.  
Verbal learning and accelerated long-term forgetting were assessed using a word list from the Rey 
Auditory verbal Learning Test (RAVLT) (Schmidt M, 1996) which was administered repeatedly (up to a 
maximum of ten trials) until recall was at a minimum of 80% (12/15 words). Recall was checked after 
a 40 second distraction period spent counting backwards from 100, and again after 30 minutes and 1 
week. The patients’ performance was compared to performance in separate groups of age and IQ 
matched participants (‘RAVLT controls’: n = 12 and 17 respectively for MB and PT).  
Autobiographical memory was assessed using the Modified Autobiographical Memory Test (MAMI) 
(Butler et al., 2007), which samples semantic and episodic information from each decade of life, using 
pre-specified topics (ie ‘a change of job in your twenties’),  and the Autobiographical Interview (AI) 
(Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2002), a test designed to elicit and score 
autobiographical information in as much detail as possible. Careful attention is paid, during scoring of 
the AI, to the distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ details. Internal details are defined as ‘those 
that pertained directly to the main event described by the participant, were specific to time and place, 
and were considered to reflect episodic re-experiencing’(Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, & 
Moscovitch, 2002). External details include semantic information, repetitions and details of events 
other than the one chosen for narration. In addition to scoring for internal and external details, 
memories are rated for specificity of place (/3) and time (/3), perceptual richness (/3), description of 
emotions and thoughts (/3), integration into a broader time scale (/3) and episodic richness (/6), giving 
a maximum score of 21 (we chose not to include the ‘AMI’ score in the ratings to facilitate comparison 
with the data of Milton et al, 2010). We calculated mean scores across all episodes for the MAMI, 
which is a constrained task, whereas for the AI we took into account only decades for which a memory 
could be retrieved. Given the patients’ complaints of very markedly depleted recollection of even 
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highly salient memories, ‘Flashbulb memory’ was also assessed by asking MB and ST about their 
recollection of hearing the news of 9/11. Their performance on the MAMI and AI was compared to 
performance by the age and IQ matched participants reported in Butler et al (Butler et al., 2007) and 
Milton et al (Milton et al., 2010) respectively. Their recollections of the events of 9/11 were compared 
to that of their spouses.  
In view of the accumulating evidence that memory and imagination share common processes, and of 
the participants’ observation that tasks requiring imagination are challenging for them, we assessed 
imaginative and future thinking using four of the eight ‘imaginary’ scenarios from Hassabis et al 
(Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007) and the two ‘future-thinking’ prompts. We followed the 
protocol described by those authors in all other respects, and compared our patients’ performance 
with the results reported there. We report the ‘experiential index’, which gives a measure of the 
‘overall richness of the imagined experience’ based on four sub-scores for content, quality (both 
scored by the rater), perceived vividness and spatial coherence (based on participant ratings), 
together with the spatial coherence index separately.    
As both MB and PT report that their memory for facts is spared, we assessed semantic memory using 
a New Words Acquisition Test (Milton et al., 2010) which probes knowledge of words which have 
entered common usage during the last six decades, and a ‘Dead or Alive Test’ (Manns, Hopkins, & 
Squire, 2003 adapted from Kapur, Young, Bateman & Kennedy, 1989) designed for use in the United 
States and which requires participants to indicate whether names are famous or non-famous and, if 
famous, whether their owners are alive or dead. We compared the patients’ performance on the New 
Words Acquisition Test with the results reported by Milton et al (Milton et al., 2010), and their 
performance on the Dead or Alive Test with that of their spouses. As IQ and media exposure both 
influence knowledge of public events (Kapur, Thompson, Kartsounis & Abbott, 1999) we asked MB, PT 
and their spouses to rate both their level of interest in public events and to what extent they are well 
informed about these on a five point scale (not at all, a little, moderately, more than most, extremely). 
MB and his spouse are both educated to degree level and both describe themselves as ‘moderately’ 
interested in and well informed about public events; PT and his spouse have 21 and 18 years of 
education respectively, and while PT describes himself as ‘extremely’ interested in and well-informed 
about public events, his spouse is ‘moderately’ interested in them and ‘better informed than most’.  
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) was used to assess mood.  
2.2.3 Statistics 
We used modified t-tests for use with single-case data (Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002) to compare 
patient and control data.  
 
3 Results 
3.1 The patients’ accounts: the view from within 
What has been lost? 
Although both MB and PT are able to recall their curricula vitae, they report a profound loss of 
recollection for autobiographical episodes, including major events such as their own weddings, the 
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births of their own children, family reunions, holidays and serious accidents (among them a car crash), 
and more minor, but typically recollected events and episodes such as novels read, films watched, 
recent meals and important conversations. PT writes: ‘I cannot even fathom being able to remember 
what movies I watched one year ago’. MB, who has no prior acquaintance with memory science, 
devised a test to determine whether he ‘really remembered an incident’, as against remembering a 
frequently revisited record of the incident, such as a photograph: he asked himself whether he could 
recollect any contextual information, for example what happened just before or after the recorded 
event, or any related feelings. Without exception he was unable to do so for events which were more 
than a few weeks old. PT, similarly, finds himself unable to recollect the temporal, spatial or sensory 
details of past events. Both MB and PT find it difficult to date memories that are more than a few 
weeks old: MB in particular describes a ‘reverse telescoping’ such that recent events appear much 
more remote. They both report an almost complete lack of ‘spontaneous memories’, memories which 
enter the mind unbidden. Both record that reading written accounts of their lives, such as their diaries, 
or reviewing family photos is ‘pretty much like finding out about someone else’s life’ - like learning 
about the biography of a stranger. They differ, however, in one important respect. While PT believes 
that his episodic memory has always been as it is now, MB is certain - and his wife confirms – that he 
once remembered events, for example events from his first marriage, which he no longer recalls, 
suggesting some ‘retroactive’ element in his condition.   
What brings the loss to light? 
One of MB’s accounts of his memory loss is entitled ‘Remember that time when…’, as invitations to 
reminisce tend – naturally enough – to highlight his impairment. PT records similar experiences, but 
in the list of his ‘retrieval failures’, which he made prospectively, he notes numerous other situations 
in which his episodic memory is challenged and found wanting – for example, by students with whom 
he has had recent conversations or email exchanges, colleagues discussing faculty business, alumni 
returning to the campus, doctors requesting details of previous symptoms, family members discussing 
previous exchanges of gifts and shared experiences.  
Metaphors for amnesia 
Both MB and PT independently describe their experience of autobiographical recollection as akin to 
probing a void: MB writes ‘my memory of much of my past [was] … black space. That’s why I feel lost 
and hopeless when groping for a memory. I’m trying to explore a void’, and elsewhere ‘I still get swept 
away trying to locate a real memory of past times, and hit the black void…’. PT echoes his words: ‘my 
experience of this difficulty …. is that my past seems like a void’, ‘my primary symptom is the void that 
is my past’. PT goes on to provide an evocative simile for his memory problem and his difficulty in 
appraising this: ‘My current analogy for this experience is that it is a bit like standing on the edge of a 
meadow at dusk. As it is getting darker, people see less and less. I stand there seeing very, very little. 
Yet others have difficulty too….How do you quantify the void, what you cannot see?’. On the rare 
occasions when PT has fragmentary images of past experiences, ‘it is as though I am looking through 
incredibly opaque glass that eliminates all details (including colours)’. Both MB and PT also use 
metaphors to describe their accelerated forgetting of recent events. MB visualises ‘my memories as a 
continuous flow of ships, some sturdy, some less so than others, which … [head out] … into the eye of 
a storm; look up, and they’ve disappeared … or they’re still there, but fainter… look up again, and 
they’re gone; the horizon’s empty; they’ve disappeared, never to be seen again.’. Elsewhere MB uses 
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the sinister analogy of a ‘memory eraser’, which he fears is drawing closer: ‘It is as if…an eraser has 
been following me at a distance, quietly deleting my daily experiences…I have noticed though that the 
distance I can see in the past – that is the memory I have of it – is getting shorter; the eraser is definitely 
getting closer … my biggest fear…’.  PT suggests ‘it is as if my car’s rear view mirror is broken; I can’t 
see much of where I’ve been. I can see what is right behind me, but beyond that things are just grey’.  
What is retained? 
Both MB and PT note that their memory for facts, if repeated, and for repeated events, is far superior 
to their memory for single events. This is particularly striking in PT’s case, as his memory for facts was 
strong enough to allow him to achieve high academic honours and establish an academic career 
despite a marked impairment of episodic memory from, at least, his teenage years. He describes a 
learning style which encourages repetition and reinforcement: he likes to consult several sources 
simultaneously. His continuing ability to learn new factual information, combined with the strategies 
mentioned below, enables him to function at a high level at work, albeit precariously at times. MB 
notes that despite the relative sparing of his memory for facts, in the absence of episodic recollection, 
my ‘knowledge of places…is less vivid’ and my ‘knowledge base is also being somewhat atrophied from 
not being refreshed’. PT describes some ‘fragmentary’ visual memories, possible ‘snapshots’ of past 
experiences, but is uncertain of the veracity of these.  
Reinventing memory science 
While PT has spent considerable time reading the academic literature about his condition over the 
last couple of years, and is thus conversant with the research, MB has not. MB’s writings are 
remarkable for their thoughtful delineation, from first principles, of many of the key distinctions used 
in contemporary memory science, some of which he later encountered as he began to research his 
own disorder. He arrives at the distinction between procedural and declarative memory: ‘I am like 
someone who can play the piano … but cannot evoke the memories of the … lessons’. He distinguishes 
‘access’ and ‘storage’ explanations for his episodic amnesia, considering various approaches to 
distinguishing these including the use of cues and the examination of dreams. He produces a 
taxonomy of ‘second hand memories’ which can masquerade as genuinely episodic ones, derived from 
i) photos, ii) repeated discussions of past events or iii) inference from various kinds of current 
evidence. He notes that once created these second-hand memories can ‘take on a life of their own’. 
He gives an exemplary description of accelerated long-term forgetting: ‘I do make a short-term 
memory of an event normally, because I can still recall recent events, but as soon as time progresses 
and my memories are transferred into longer-term memory … I can no longer retrieve them. They’re 
as lost as the memories of the previous forty years’. He distinguishes his ‘personal biography’ - which 
is roughly intact – from his record of individual experiences – which is not. He finds the distinction 
between episodic and semantic memory particularly resonant, as does PT, as it enables him to capture 
the essence of his impairment, ‘the loss of decades of episodic memories’, in contrast to the sparing 
of the ‘semantic … knowledge extracted from our life experiences’.   
The impact of the loss 
PT and MB describe the impact of their loss in similar terms. Their accounts touch on six main areas: 
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i) Weakened sense of self: both MB and PT describe a sense of estrangement from their past selves, 
caused by their inability to recall specific episodes which would exemplify the kinds of people they 
are and the activities they like to engage in. PT, for example, writes: ‘I just don't have the knowledge 
of my own past, the … the ‘moorings’  that others can draw upon to remind them of who they really 
are. I have working assumptions about who I am, but for the most part I cannot produce evidence 
from my past to back up those working assumptions’.  
ii) Impaired social relationships: PT writes that his impairment quite markedly affects the quality of his 
relationships. ‘I feel extremely disconnected from the past’, and ‘once I leave a place, I virtually never 
stay in touch or maintain contacts….I suspect that I don’t really have a choice in the matter. That is, I 
can’t remember shared experiences’. An amusing corollary is that ‘I’m particularly good at ‘forgive and 
forget’ or in my case ‘forget and forgive’…I don’t harbour a grudge, because I don’t have painful 
memories about previous encounters’. MB describes the effects of his impairment in similar terms: 
‘As a result of losing the common past I shared with friends and family, in some mysterious way a 
barrier has come down between us…I feel less ‘connected’ to them, as if somewhat forced to live in a 
world of my own, as a deaf person might’. Elsewhere MB describes a ‘lack of texture, an emptiness’ in 
his relationships.  
iii) Feeling isolated: Both MB and PT describe a strong emotional reaction to their predicament, of 
which the most abiding element is their sense of isolation. Both feel that their lack of autobiographical 
episodic memory has a pervasive effect on their experience, but this is difficult to convey to others as 
their everyday functioning is so good: ‘this disability is bizarre and difficult to explain, and for others 
to believe. It’s proved hard for others to really comprehend and accept it’. PT echoes these words: 
‘I’m just not sure that most people can understand what it means to have virtually no episodic 
memory’. He believes that his emotions are swayed more markedly than they otherwise would be by 
recent events, in the absence of a buffering effect from a memory of more remote ones. MB describes 
periods of grief, frustration and anger and laments the loss of the ‘self-nourishment’ that episodic 
memories provide.  
iv) Insecurity about autobiographical memories: PT describes the undermining effect of his lack of 
episodic recollection on his confidence in the veracity of his well-worn stories about past episodes - 
‘without having episodic memories about them, I’m left wondering about their truthfulness’. His 
semanticised memories lack authenticity.  
v) Impaired planning and decision making: While both PT and MB are able to summon imagery to the 
mind’s eye, both suspect that their depleted stock of episodic memories has impaired their ability to 
plan. MB writes: ‘Until I suffered this loss I didn’t realise to what extent our lives are informed by the 
past…Making any kind of informed decisions in the present is much harder when it’s not possible to 
recall what was satisfying in the past’. PT writes that certain kinds of tasks, particularly open-ended 
ones for which no pre-existing structure will guide the solution, defeat him: ‘I just felt like I’d hit an 
impasse. I got that ‘butterflies’ feeling in the pit of my stomach that you get when something just 
utterly and completely vexes you…’.  
vi) Concerns about progression: MB was concerned initially that he might be suffering from dementia. 
He remains concerned, despite stable bedside testing, that the period over which he can retain 
memories is shrinking and that this may increasingly ‘imprison him in the present’. For PT, given the 
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gradual dawning of his realisation that his autobiographical memory was poor and always had been, 
such concerns were more muted.  
Coping strategies 
Both MB and PT report embarrassment and difficulty in social situations which call for recollection. 
MB writes: ‘Though I can appear to be part of such a conversation, I can’t really contribute anything 
to it. I don’t have the faintest thread that would lead me back to the experience being discussed …I 
notice myself intentionally avoiding those … conversations or, if caught, I notice now that I sidestep 
them … or try to contribute to the conversation in some other way. I try to guide the conversation 
away from that area or conversationally pass the ball to others.’. Both MB and PT report that at times 
when they don’t wish to acknowledge or discuss their problem, they will try to ‘fake it’ - not always 
successfully.  PT writes at length of his coping strategies: ‘I honestly find myself constantly thinking 
about how to engineer my environment to compensate for my faulty memory’. These methods range 
from a reliance on routine, liberal use of notes, frequent prompts from his secretary, encouragement 
of colleagues to keep him updated, flashcards filled out by his students to electronic alarms, and a 
searchable email archive. These strategies come close to creating a fully-fledged artificial memory 
which, it turns out, both MB and PT have envisaged.  
Prosthetic memory 
Both MB and PT feel some compulsion to document their lives by artificial means, recreating, in a 
sense, the autobiographical memory they lack. PT took up the hobby of photography to do so. MB 
describes a more elaborate project, an attempt to ‘reconstruct’ his life, involving the digital collation 
of memorabilia, documents, genealogical information, CVs, appointment books, diaries, journals, 
videos, audio tapes and ‘hundreds of photographs’. While these make it possible to ‘review’ episodes 
from the past that neither MB nor PT can recall, the effort is in a way frustrating, as the review lacks 
the normal ‘warmth’ of recollection. Both MB and PT report that they can capture some of that 
warmth with the help of highly evocative, emotional stimuli which fail to trigger specific recollections 
but nevertheless convey them into a ‘generic past’. In MB’s case familiar poems, in particular, have 
this quality of ‘resonance and poignancy’. For PT music has a similar effect, and he listens especially 
to music with a ‘strong element of ‘high school-ness’ which allows him to enjoy a kind of ‘emotional 
re-experiencing [of] that era….When you’re otherwise hard-pressed to remember episodes from large 
chunks of your life, that’s no small thing. I have music that reminds me of college and childhood as 
well.’  
A final resource deserves a mention. Both MB and PT have always regarded their wives’ episodic 
memories as exceptional. They have come to recognise that this partly reflects their own difficulties 
in this domain. Nevertheless, each relies heavily on his partner’s ability to recollect his own and his 
family’s past.  
3.2 Neuropsychological results: 
3.2.1  IQ and ACE-R 
In keeping with their educational and professional attainments, estimated IQs were 122 (MB) and 124 
(PT). Full scale IQs, assessed using the WASI, were 127 and 124. MB scored 30/30 on the MMSE, 
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96/100 on the ACE, including 26/26 on the measures of memory, with 10/10 for delayed recall. PT’s 
corresponding scores were 30/30, 97/100, 24/26 and 9/10. These scores are well within normal limits.  
3.2.2  Long term forgetting (RAVLT) 
On the RAVLT, MB and PT reached the criterion of 80% correct recall in 4 trials, recalling 12/15 (80%) 
and 13/15 (87%) words respectively after a filled delay of 40 seconds. There were no significant 
differences between MB and the age and IQ matched RAVLT  controls or between PT and the controls 
in the number of trials required to reach criterion, or on their scores at the final learning trial, after 
40s, 30 minutes or 1 week. Both forgot more information between 30 minutes and 1 week than 
average (z scores – 0.53 and – 1.43 for MB and PT respectively) but neither value reached significance 
(see Supplementary Material).  
3.2.3  Autobiographical memory: Modified Autobiographical Memory Interview (Figure 1 and 
Supplementary Material) 
MB’s episodic memory scores were significantly lower than those of the MAMI controls (p < 0.001) 
and, in fact, than those of TEA patients (p < 0.01). His autobiographical semantic scores were also 
significantly lower than those of the controls (p<0.001).  
PT was impaired by comparison with MAMI controls on the episodic (p<0.001) but not the semantic 
element of the MAMI, with relative sparing of the first two and the current decades of life.  
3.2.4  Autobiographical memory: Autobiographical interview (Figure 2 and Supplementary 
Material) 
All memories were scored by the first author and a second, highly experienced, rater. Inter-rater 
reliability was high as evinced by correlations of 1.0 for internal details and 0.94 for ratings.  
MB: MB’s mean score for total internal details for all decades prior to the current (17.25) is significantly 
below the mean score of healthy control participants (mean 58.0, sd  7.9, p<0.001) and somewhat, 
but not significantly lower than the mean score of patients with TEA (mean 30.8 internal details, sd 
13.2, p = 0.170, control data from Milton et al, 2010). His score for the current decade, relating to an 
event that had occurred about two weeks before (54), is intermediate between the mean score in the 
healthy control group (79.58, sd 22.09) and the TEA group mean (41.43 sd 11.45), but not significantly 
different from either. This was the only memory which, he felt, transported him back to the context 
of the event so that he could ‘remember what it was like to be there’. However, one year after this 
event, he had no recollection whatsoever of its occurrence. This pattern of results in reflected in the 
rating scores: for decades prior to the current, MB’s mean score (8.5) is significantly lower than the 
score obtained by control participants (mean control rating 17.9, sd 0.97, p <0.001) and somewhat, 
but not significantly lower than the mean score of patients with TEA (mean TEA patient rating 12.7, sd 
3.15, p=0.220). For the current decade, MB’s rating of 16 is lower than the control value (mean 20.83, 
sd 0.39, p<0.001) and close to the TEA group mean (16.29, sd 2.998). 
PT: PT’s mean score for total internal details for all decades prior to the current (15.5) is well below 
the mean scores of healthy control participants (p<0.001) and somewhat, but not significantly, lower 
than the scores of patients with TEA (p=0.142).  His score for the current decade (46), relating to an 
event that had occurred one week before, is intermediate between the healthy control group and the 
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TEA group means, but not significantly different from either. As was the case for MB, this was the only 
memory which clearly transported him back to the context of the event so that he could ‘remember 
what it was like to be there’.  One year later his score for this event was very similar to his mean scores 
for remote events. This pattern of results is again reflected in the ratings scores, with a significantly 
lower mean rating for decades prior to the current (8) than in controls (p<0.001) but not in patients 
with TEA. For the current decade, his rating of 15 is lower than the control value (p<0.001) and close 
to the TEA group mean.  
3.2.5  Flashbulb memory 
Both participants were asked if they could remember when they first heard the news of the 9/11 
attack on the Twin Towers in 2001. They both recollected the essential facts of the attack. PT had no 
clear recollection of hearing this news, but believed that he was at home when a news announcement 
cut into the programming. He could not recall who else was in the house at the time or any other 
events from the day. MB had no recollection whatsoever of hearing the news for the first time. Both 
spouses, in contrast, had detailed recollections of the circumstances in which they first heard the 
news, their company at the time, their thoughts and feelings and the actions that the news caused 
them to take.  
3.2.6 Imagination (Figure 3) 
 PT’s mean experiential index, 24.6/60, is significantly below the control mean reported by Hassabis 
et al (2007) of 45.1/60 (sd 4.02, p<0.001), and similar to the reported mean of 27.5/60 (sd 13.12) for 
amnesic subjects. MB found the imagination and future thinking task difficult and unpleasant, but 
achieved a score (22.2) similar to PT’s mean score, in the single scenario he attempted. PT’s mean 
spatial coherence index (-5), which was identical to the score for MB’s single completed scenario, is, 
similarly, significantly lower than the control mean of 3.68 (sd 1.3, p<0.001) but not significantly 
different from the patient mean of 0.1 (sd 3.21).  
3.2.7  New words 
MB scored 76/84 (0.90) on the new word definition recall test, 37/42 (0.88) on the new word definition 
recognition test; PT scored 72/84 (0.86) and 40/42 (0.95) respectively. IQ matched control means from 
Milton et al 2010 were 0.73 and 0.88. Thus MB and PT performed above control means on this test.  
3.2.8 Dead or alive  
On this demanding test, MB and PT outperformed their spouses, correctly identifying names as 
famous/not famous in 245/252 (97.2%) and 235/252 (93.2%) cases vs 213/252 (84.5%) and 231/252 
(91.6%) in their spouses. The corresponding values for correct ‘Dead or Alive’ judgements (for those 
names correctly identified as famous) were 106/120 (88%) and 83/109 (76%) vs 63/103 (61%) and 
78/111 (70%).  
3.2.9 HADS 
PT scored 3/28 on the anxiety scale of the HADS, 0/28 on the depression scale, both well within normal 
limits. MB scored 12/28 on the anxiety scale, which is in the abnormal range (>10), 9/28 on the 
depression scale which is in the borderline range (10-12), in keeping with his history of mood disorder.  
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4 Discussion  
4.1  Main findings 
MB and PT give eloquent descriptions of an unusual form of memory loss, which partially spares 
memory for recent events, and permits effective functioning in intellectually demanding roles, yet 
leads to loss of recall over extended intervals and devastates remote autobiographical recollection. A 
similar pattern of impairment has been described recently in other patients with temporal lobe 
epilepsy, especially patients with Transient Epileptic Amnesia (Addis, Moscovitch, and McAndrews 
2007;Butler and Zeman 2008;Hornberger, Mohamed, Miller, Watson, Thayer, and Hodges 
2010;Milton et al. 2010;Noulhiane, Piolino, Hasboun, Clemenceau, Baulac, and Samson 2007;Tramoni 
et al. 2011;Zeman, Butler, Muhlert, and Milton 2013). Here we consider in turn the pattern of memory 
impairment, its impact and its interpretation in the light of the existing literature.  
4.2 The pattern of memory impairment 
Both MB and PT were initially reassured, on the basis of standard tests of recall and recognition, that 
their memories were essentially normal. This does not of course prove that their anterograde 
memories are entirely or consistently normal, and more demanding tests might have revealed 
shortcomings: indeed it is clear from their autobiographical memory scores that over extended 
intervals their anterograde memory is severely impaired. Nevertheless, no marked memory 
impairment was apparent using widely accepted measures, and both MD and PT were dismayed by 
the discrepancy between their subjective impression that their memories were defective and the 
apparently normal results of objective testing. In contrast to the normal results of standard tests, both 
MB and PT perform very poorly, as would be expected from their testimony, on measures of 
autobiographical memory. Neither shows a clearly abnormal forgetting rate on the RAVLT over 1 
week: more extended testing would be of interest. In contrast to the impoverishment of their 
autobiographical memory, both MB and PT report a relatively normal memory for facts, and PT in 
particular has noticed a considerable benefit from repetition. This is borne out by their performance 
on measures of semantic memory. The memory profile is thus one of substantially normal 
performance on standard anterograde memory tests, in the presence of a marked autobiographical 
amnesia, with suggestive evidence of accelerated long-term forgetting from their subjective accounts, 
but well preserved semantic memory. Both also complain of topographical memory impairment 
though this has not been formally assessed. MB, but not PT, believes that his autobiographical 
memory was once normal, and that he has lost a multitude of remote memories which were once 
vivid. In both MB and PT there is some evidence for an associated impairment of future thinking and 
imagination.  
4.3 The impact of the memory impairment 
Episodic memory enables us to adapt to a world that is both stable and changeful. Autobiographical 
memory in particular, helps i) to shape our knowledge and sense of ourselves, ii) to mediate 
interpersonal relationships, and iii) to supply knowledge of the past that allows us to envision and plan 
for the future (Kihlstrom, 2009; Routledge, Sedikides, W, Wildschut, & Juhl, 2013; Pillemer DB & 
Kuwabara KJ, 2012; D'Argembeau A, 2012). The accounts by MB and PT illustrate each of these 
functions.  
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i) They describe a disconcerting impoverishment of recollection that makes facts about their own pasts 
feel equivalent to facts about a stranger’s past. This, in turn, reduces their confidence in their self-
knowledge, reflecting the loss of what William James described as the ‘warmth and intimacy’ that 
characterises those memories ‘ “appropriated” by the thinker as his own’(James, 1890).  If  ‘episodic 
memory is normally infused with ‘consciousness of the self as the one who experienced the event and 
possesses the memory’ (Moscovitch M, 2012), it is understandable that such a severe depletion of 
episodic memory should impoverish the experience of the self, just as MB and PT describe.  Loss of 
the ability to reminisce deprives them of the psychological benefits of ‘nostalgia’(Routledge, Sedikides, 
W, Wildschut, & Juhl, 2013), most notably its capacity to ‘imbue life with purpose and meaning’.  
ii) Their accounts point to an especially critical role for episodic autobiographical memory in tracking 
changes in the social world. Both report that they are embarrassed in social situations which involve 
shared acts of recollection, and feel isolated by their inability to participate fully in these. PT describes 
a resulting loss of motivation to maintain long-term social relationships outside his immediate family.  
iii) They both describe a reduction in their capacity for imaginative thinking about the future, and 
open-ended problem solving. Their markedly impaired performance on measures of imagination and 
future thinking is in keeping with their accounts. These observations echo the growing evidence that 
recollection of the past and contemplation of the future are closely interlinked at both cognitive and 
neural levels(Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007), and that 
amnesia impairs the ability to plan and problem solve effectively(Sheldon, McAndrews, & Moscovitch, 
2011). It is of interest that imagination and future thinking should be impaired in individuals whose 
memory impairment only becomes apparent at extended intervals.  
4.4 The interpretation of the memory impairment 
The pattern of memory impairment in these patients and others like them raises several questions of 
interpretation which we discuss below in turn.  
4.4.1  What is the neuropsychological basis of the deficit?  
There are two main competing explanations for the pattern of memory impairment described here, 
involving relatively well preserved anterograde memory on standard memory tests, with fading of 
memories over longer intervals and depletion of the autobiographical store. The most natural 
explanation is in terms of a disturbance of processes of consolidation that operate over these intervals, 
combined, possibly, with a retroactive ‘erasure of previously well-established memories, particularly 
suggested by MB’s account. Candidate targets for the disruption of later phases of consolidation 
include later phases of LTP or LTD involving glutamatergic transmission, the processes of  ‘replay’ 
which are thought to support consolidation, and a range of additional factors which contribute to 
determining the long term fate of memories including atypical protein kinase C isoform M-zeta 
(PKMZeta), a protein with a key role in long-term potentiation and the maintenance of long-term 
memory, and neurogenesis(Hardt, Nader, & Nadel, 2013; Redondo & Morris, 2011). The loss of 
previously well-established memories could result either from direct damage to the engrams 
themselves or from interference with processes of reconsolidation.  
However, there are at least two alternative explanations. The first, methodological, alternative 
suggests that the pattern of impairment in these cases does not reflect a distinctive pathology of 
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memory, but rather a damaged memory system which we are assessing with poorly matched tasks: 
specifically, the measures of anterograde and retrograde memory used in the majority of studies of 
autobiographical memory fail to compare like with like (Kopelman MD, 2004). The tests we use to 
probe memory at longer intervals (such as the AI) are certainly very different to those with which we 
normally examine it at shorter, standard, ones (such as paragraph and word list learning): if the 
retrograde tests are more difficult, it could be that the apparent dissociation of anterograde and 
autobiographical memory is an illusion.  Work showing that patients with temporal lobe epilepsy have 
particularly severe difficulty, even at relatively short delays, in retrieving ‘perceptual’ as opposed to 
‘story’ details, highlights the possibility that standard measures, such as word lists, may fail to tap 
anterograde capacities that are highly relevant to autobiographical memory (St-Laurent, Moscovitch, 
Jadd & MCAndrews, 2014).  
The second alternative explanation takes account of evidence that standard laboratory tests of 
episodic memory activate substantially different neural networks to those activated by 
autobiographical tasks (Gilboa, 2004; McDermott, Szpunar & Christ, 2009). In keeping with this 
observation, standard anterograde measures fail to distinguish individuals with ‘highly superior, 
autobiographical memory performance’ (LePort et al., 2012). Thus the relative normality of standard 
measures in our patients may reflect the insensitivity of these measures to autobiographical memory 
impairment for both methodological and neurobiological reasons.  
Two lines of evidence render a solely methodological explanation unlikely. First, there are now several 
examples of patients with impeccable performance on anterograde tests at standard intervals who 
nonetheless show marked accelerated long term forgetting and autobiographical memory loss (Butler 
& Zeman, 2008a; Jansari, Davis, McGibbon, Firminger, & Kapur, 2010; Tramoni et al., 2011; Witt et al., 
2015). Tramoni’s study, in particular, addressed the question of differential difficulty by ensuring that 
anterograde and retrograde tests were matched for difficulty. In the absence of any evidence for 
ceiling effects on the standard tests, the dissociation between performance at standard and at longer 
intervals in these patients, using tests matched for difficulty, suggests a disruption of ‘later’ processes, 
or, at the very least, a disruption of memory which only becomes apparent at long delays. Future 
studies of this issue could attempt to compare ‘like with like’ systematically, by, for example, testing 
memory for words at long intervals using remember-know judgements, and by assessing 
autobiographical memory at short and long retention intervals. Second, some authors (Muhlert, 
Milton, Butler, Kapur, & Zeman, 2010; Hoefeijzers, Dewar, Della, Zeman, & Butler, 2013) have found 
that while in healthy subjects memory at 30 minutes predicts performance at 1 week, this correlation 
is lost in patients like those reported here . This again points to a role for events occurring some time 
after memory acquisition. The relative sparing of recent memories seen in MB and PT assessed using 
the AI is in keeping with this suggestion.  However, it would be of great interest to use approaches like 
those of St-Laurent et al (St-Laurent, Moscovitch, Jadd & MCAndrews, 2014), focussing on recollection 
of perceptual details, to examine newly formed memories in MB and PT at short delays.  
While differential difficulty of anterograde and retrograde memory measures is unlikely to be the sole 
explanation for the pattern of impairment considered here, it is not clear that any behavioural test 
can absolutely exclude the possibility that the memories formed in such patients are fragile from the 
start, yet sufficiently resilient to maintain memory function at short delays. Distinguishing this 
possibility from a disruption of later memory processes requires a better understanding of the 
underlying biology of this form of memory disorder.  
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4.4.2 What is the underlying aetiology of the deficit? 
The pattern of memory impairment described here has been reported almost exclusively among 
patients with epilepsy, yet many of these patients - like MB and PT - have been seizure-free, or having 
only very infrequent seizures, at the time of study. Some but not all studies have identified correlations 
between seizure frequency(Jokeit, Daamen, Zang, Janszky, & Ebner, 2001; Mameniskiene, Jatuzis, 
Kaubrys, & Budrys, 2006; Wilkinson et al., 2012; Narayanan et al., 2012), or the frequency of interictal 
epileptiform activity(Mameniskiene, Jatuzis, Kaubrys, & Budrys, 2006; Fitzgerald, Thayer, Mohamed, 
& Miller, 2013), and memory loss over long intervals. Anecdotal reports from patients and limited 
published evidence suggests that memory is sometimes improved by treatment(Goldstein, Patel, 
Aspinall, & Lishman, 1992; O'Connor, Sieggreen, Ahern, Schomer, & Mesulam, 1997; Tombini et al., 
2005; Midorikawa & Kawamura, 2007; Razavi, Barrash, & Paradiso, 2010), but one careful, recent, 
single case study found no improvement on treatment(Jansari, Davis, McGibbon, Firminger, & Kapur, 
2010). Taken in the round, this evidence suggests that both epileptiform activity and some structural 
or neurochemical correlate of epilepsy in the MTLs or their connections are likely to be relevant to the 
pattern of memory loss we have observed. It may be significant that both MB and PT have continuing, 
albeit rare, ictal events, which may be a pointer to more frequent subclinical events with a disruptive 
effect on memory. MB, indeed, satisfies diagnostic criteria for Transient Epileptic Amnesia which has 
been associated with the pattern of memory loss described in this paper (Zeman, Boniface, & Hodges, 
1998; Butler et al., 2007; Zeman, Butler, Muhlert, & Milton, 2013). Further examination of the 
relationship of EEG changes to memory impairment, of the impact of treatment on memory function, 
including memory at extended delays, and of the fine-grained neuroanatomy of the MTLs and their 
connections in patients with these forms of memory impairment should all help to shed light on this 
question.  
While mood disturbance has been prominent in MB’s case, this is not true of PT, and has not been 
notable in other reported cases: mood disorder is therefore unlikely to be the root cause. In discussion 
of MB’s, PT’s and similar cases, ‘dissociative’, ‘functional’ or ‘psychogenic’ amnesia has sometimes 
been proposed as the most probable diagnosis. A number of considerations make this an unlikely 
explanation for these cases as a class and for MB and PT’s cases in particular. Markowitsch and 
Staniloiu (Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 2013) have suggested that six criteria support a diagnosis of 
‘functional retrograde amnesia’: i) selective retrograde amnesia; ii) loss of personal identity; iii) 
absence of a physical or medical cause for amnesia; iv) relationship of the onset to psychological 
trauma or stress; v) prior history of psychological trauma or mood disorder; vi) belle indifference. Only 
one of these (i) applies to PT’s case and only two (i and v) to MB’s. Moreover, the marked dissociation 
between preserved semantic and impaired episodic recollection is not a common feature in 
dissociative amnesia, and indeed the impairment of semantic memory for one’s personal past is a 
hallmark of dissociative amnesia, while impairment of episodic recall is the striking feature of the cases 
described here. Finally cases like those of MB and PT conform to a distinctive pattern which we 
compare below to other causes of ‘disproportionate’ autobiographical amnesia (AbA).  
We also consider two other possible explanations of MB’s and ST’s amnesia to be unlikely. Many 
patients with this pattern of AbA are taking effective doses of anticonvulsant medication. However, 
the pattern has been reported in patients who are not receiving medication(Jansari, Davis, McGibbon, 
Firminger, & Kapur, 2010), the doses required are generally low and many patients report an 
improvement in their memory when treatment begins (see above). An explanation in terms of drug 
17 
 
side effects therefore appears unlikely also. Finally, one could give a sceptical interpretation of MB 
and PT’s symptoms in terms of an excessively high expectation of autobiographical memory, or, 
correspondingly, an abnormally low threshold for symptoms of memory dysfunction. However, the 
objective impairment of their performance on measures of autobiographical memory argues strongly 
against this view.  
4.4.3   What is spared?  
The key distinction between the knowledge spared and knowledge lost in MB and PT is between 
factual or semantic memory (spared) and contextual or episodic memory (impaired). Both report 
preservation of factual, context free knowledge. Both report a massive loss of memory for the 
contextual details of past events, whether temporal, spatial or sensory. For both repetition is greatly 
beneficial to later recall, with a sharper than usual contrast between recollection of unique and 
repeated events.  
In these respects MB and PT resemble patients with developmental amnesia, in whom perinatal 
damage to the MTL is associated with episodic amnesia coupled with well-preserved semantic 
memory(De Haan M., Mishkin, Baldeweg, & Vargha-Khadem, 2006; Picard et al., 2013). MB and PT 
differ from these patients in that their episodic recall for very recent events, of the past few hours or 
days, is relatively rich. The question of whether the memory impairment seen in MB and PT differs in 
kind or in degree from that seen in developmental amnesia echoes the question posed above about 
the best characterisation of their memory impairment, whether as a disorder of acquisition or of 
consolidation. 
4.5  The neurology of autobiographical amnesia 
The pattern of memory impairment in the cases of MB and PT, with relatively preserved anterograde 
memory at standard intervals, suggestive evidence of accelerated long-term forgetting and 
pronounced autobiographical amnesia is distinctive. How does it compare to other forms of 
‘disproportionate’ autobiographical amnesia described in the literature due to acquired neurological 
disorder? Given the complexity of the processes involved in autobiographical memory (Svoboda, 
McKinnon, & Levine, 2006; St Jacques, 2012), it is to be expected that autobiographical amnesia can 
result from a range of pathologies. At least five forms of this phenomenon have been described, in 
addition to the type exemplified by the cases of MB and PT.  
i) Diffuse pathology: Evans et al (Evans JJ, Breen EK, Antoun N, & Hodges JR, 1996; Evans JJ, Graham 
KS, Pratt KH, & Hodges JR, 2003)reported a patient, JM, with severe retrograde memory loss for 
autobiographical events following recovery from cerebral vasculitis. Her case is remarkable for well-
preserved anterograde memory on standard tests, on measures of ALF, and on measures of post-
accident autobiographical memory, although she has not been assessed using the exacting AI. 
Bifrontal, left parietal and left temporal lobe changes were noted on MRI and SPECT scans. The authors 
interpret the ‘focal’ autobiographical amnesia demonstrated in this case in terms of ‘damage to  either 
lower level features of memories, or, perhaps more likely, the pathways that are required to connect 
those mnemonic fragments into an event’ caused by the multifocal pathology evident on imaging. This 
damage, remarkably, must have spared critical structures in the memory system required to acquire, 
consolidate, store and retrieve new autobiographical memories.   
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ii) Right temporofrontal pathology: Levine et al (Levine B et al., 1998; Levine, Svoboda, Turner, Mandic, 
& Mackey, 2009) described a patient, ML, with marked autobiographical memory loss for events 
preceding a severe traumatic brain injury which damaged the region of the right uncinate fasciculus 
which connects the inferior frontal with the temporal lobe.  This damage was associated with reduced 
activation of the right frontal pole, using PET, and of midline frontal and posterior regions, using fMRI, 
in episodic retrieval tasks. Like JM, ML performed normally on standard tests of anterograde memory, 
but unlike JM there was evidence of an impairment of recollective or ‘autonoetic’ awareness of post-
injury events: ML had, to some degree, lost the ability to re-experience the entirety of his past, both 
pre- and post-injury. Piolino et al (Piolino et al., 2005)describe a complex case of disproportionate 
retrograde amnesia in which PET imaging also showed evidence of right inferior frontal 
hypometabolism. A group study of retrograde amnesia likewise implicated the frontal lobes(Kopelman 
et al., 2003).  
iii) Pathology in visual cortices: Rubin(Rubin & Greenberg, 1998) has drawn attention to a distinctive 
form of predominantly retrograde autobiographical amnesia associated with visual memory 
impairment due to damage to posterior cortical regions (with the implication that performance on 
standard memory tests will not be normal in this subgroup of patients). This phenomenon is thought 
to reflect the key role of visual memory in most autobiographical memories.  
iv) Severely deficient autobiographical memory syndrome (Palombo, Alain, Soderlund, Khuu, & Levine, 
2015): the syndrome, which may be related to the previous category, was recently described in three 
individuals with a marked, lifelong impairment of autobiographical recollection, with otherwise 
normal cognition and day to day functioning,  excepting an impairment of visual recall. Functional 
imaging studies (fMRI, EEG) revealed alterations in biomarkers linked to autobiographical recollection, 
in particular reduction of activation on fMRI in key midline regions (left medial prefrontal cortex and 
right precuneus) during autobiographical recollection and reduced event related potentials to correct 
recognition in left parietal sites at around 500 msecs. Right hippocampal volumes were smaller in 
patients than comparison participants. 
v) ‘Functional’ amnesia: ‘functional’ or ‘psychogenic’ amnesia is often characterised by a predominant 
retrograde amnesia, sometimes including loss of personal identity, in combination with well-
preserved anterograde memory (Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 2013; Kopelman, 2002; Kritchevsky, Chang, 
& Squire, 2004). It is frequently associated with a past history of psychiatric or psychological disorder 
and triggered by the occurrence of disturbing life events which may not at first be evident. It is, thus, 
an important differential diagnosis in any patient with a disproportionate retrograde amnesia. There 
may be some common ground between the neurobiology of functional amnesia and other forms of 
autobiographical amnesia.  
The form of autobiographical amnesia described in this paper belongs to a sixth type, which has been 
increasingly well documented over the past decade:  
vi) Temporal lobe epilepsy: remote memory loss has now been described among patients with chronic 
refractory epilepsy(Viskontas, McAndrews, & Moscovitch, 2000; Addis, Moscovitch, & McAndrews, 
2007; Lah, Lee, Grayson, & Miller, 2006), following temporal lobectomy(Lah, Grayson, Lee, & Miller, 
2004; Noulhiane et al., 2007), in adult-onset drug sensitive TLE(Tramoni et al., 2011), as the presenting 
feature of TLE in combination with subtle seizures(Jansari, Davis, McGibbon, Firminger, & Kapur, 2010) 
and as a prodromal phenomenon, preceding the clinical onset of epilepsy(Hornberger et al., 2010). It 
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is particularly common in TEA, occurring in 2/3 of patients(Butler et al., 2007). It can occur among 
patients with normal or near normal anterograde memory on standard tests, but is often, though not 
always, associated with accelerated long-term forgetting. A similar case was recently described as a 
result of exposure to treatment with high dose intrathecal baclofen(Zeman et al., 2016). Potential 
explanations for amnesia in patients with TLE include poor encoding of experiences as a result of 
concurrent seizure activity, poor consolidation due to ALF, and loss of access to or erasure of existing 
retained memories. The impairment of ‘recall of highly specific contextual information such as 
perceptual details, thoughts and emotions, and fine-grained temporal relations… those detailed 
elements that support vivid recollection of past experiences’(McAndrews MP, 2012), as described so 
clearly by MB and PT, is characteristic. The details of the relationship between autobiographical 
amnesia and anterograde memory impairment in patients with TLE remains ‘an open 
question’(McAndrews MP, 2012). Answering this question will require further research using 
searching tests of anterograde memory over standard delays, tests of ALF and measures of 
anterograde memory which mirror those used to test retrograde memory, making it possible to 
‘compare like with like’(Kopelman MD, 2004). In interpreting the results obtained using these 
measures, however, it will be important to remember that co-occurring deficits may not be causally 
linked.  
4.6 Contrasts and limitations  
While the cases of MB and PT have several similarities, there are also informative differences between 
them. PT believes that his autobiographical and topographical memory have always been poor, in 
keeping with his longstanding TLE. He cannot remember a time when he had access to rich episodic 
memories for events occurring more than 1-2 months previously. MB, by contrast, reports that his 
autobiographical memory was normal until an unexplained deterioration nine years ago, 26 years 
after the onset of his epilepsy. His wife corroborates this account. Thus, whereas PT’s autobiographical 
memory impairment can be explained by an anterograde memory impairment of some kind, including 
ALF, MB’s impairment is likely to be due, at least in part, to a ‘retroactive’ process, involving erasure 
of or loss of access to established memories or some combination of these factors.  
We acknowledge several limitations to the current study. While both patients were reassured 
following thorough standard neuropsychological assessment that they showed no evidence of 
memory impairment, it is possible that more exacting tests of anterograde memory might have been 
more revealing, for example measures of forced choice recognition, pattern separation, associative 
memory or the perceptual richness of recently formed memories. Similarly, the sampling of public 
knowledge in this study was limited, and it is possible that more detailed tests, for example probing 
contextual details such as, mode and date of death in the Dead or Alive Test, might have revealed 
deficits that were not apparent on the limited range of tests used here.  
4.7 Conclusions 
This paper has described the objective features in two cases of epilepsy-associated memory loss in 
parallel with the experience of the two individuals concerned, as documented in their accounts. The 
key features are the relative normality of performance on standard memory tests, and preservation 
of semantic memory, in contrast to a profound amnesia for salient autobiographical episodes, 
suggestive evidence of ALF, and an impairment of imagination. The first person accounts illustrate the 
importance of autobiographical memory in sustaining a coherent sense of self, informing 
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interpersonal relationships and supporting imaginative thought. Establishing the relative 
contributions of impairment of early and later stages of memory processing to this pattern of amnesia, 
and the roles of physiological and structural pathology, requires further research. Adding one further 
metaphor to those in the writings of MB and ST, it is as if the soil of their memory systems has been 
thinned: rich, experiential memories can briefly take root there, but lack the tenacity required to 
withstand the winds of time.  
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Figures 
Figure 1: Modified Autobiographical Memory Interview: mean semantic and episodic score/decade; 
error bars show standard deviations (control and TEA data from Butler et al., 2007). 
Figure 2: Autobiographical Interview: mean internal detail scores for previous decades, internal details 
score for current decade; error bars show standard deviations (control and TEA data from Milton et 
al., 2010). 
Figure 3: Experiential index and spatial coherence scores; error bars show standard deviations (mean 
control and amnesic data from Hassabis et al., 2007). 
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